For a long time, the Muslim world followed an unspoken ritual. When internal disputes became politically costly, the solution was sought not in negotiations but in Makkah. Not for pilgrimage, but for reconciliation.
The most famous example came in February 2007. King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz invited the leaders of Fatah and Hamas to the holy city. With the Kaaba as a backdrop, Khaled Meshaal and Mahmoud Abbas signed the Makkah Agreement.
The world saw images of unity, the guns in Gaza briefly fell silent, and a national unity government was announced. Four months later, that unity collapsed when Hamas seized control of Gaza. The agreement did not survive.
In 2019, Makkah hosted another ambitious effort. More than twelve hundred scholars from across the Muslim world gathered and signed the Makkah Declaration, also called the Charter of Makkah. It rejected sectarianism, extremism and hate speech. It was described as a new charter for moderate Islam.
Yet, on the ground in Yemen and Syria, sectarian conflicts intensified. This reveals a consistent pattern. The pacts initiated in Makkah carried enormous moral weight but lacked effective mechanisms for implementation. They were strong on ethics, weak on enforcement.
On March 10, 2023, the announcement of peace did not come from Makkah. It came from Beijing. Saudi Arabia and Iran declared the restoration of diplomatic relations after a seven-year rupture.
The mediator was not an imam or an American envoy but Wang Yi, China’s chief diplomat. Many commentators in Islamabad and New Delhi initially dismissed it as an anomaly. In reality, it signalled a potentially significant shift in regional diplomacy.
For nearly seven decades, the United States played a dominant role in mediation in the Middle East. From Camp David in 1978 to the Abraham Accords in 2020, major diplomatic breakthroughs were often American-sponsored.
The war in Gaza after October 7, 2023, further undermined Washington’s position as a perceived neutral mediator. The United States vetoed multiple ceasefire resolutions at the UN Security Council while continuing military supplies to Israel. In the eyes of many in the Global South, its claim to neutrality was severely damaged.
Beijing recognised the diplomatic opening and moved with precision. It did not make its approach primarily about democracy or governance. Instead, it offered something compelling to both Riyadh and Tehran: the prospect of greater economic stability.
China remains a major trading partner for both countries, purchasing substantial quantities of Saudi crude and most Iranian oil exports through various arrangements. When Beijing signals that instability threatens economic interests, both capitals have reasons to pay attention.
This is not traditional soft power alone; it is structural leverage. That leverage has helped sustain the Saudi-Iranian diplomatic rapprochement since 2023, although it does not guarantee lasting peace or resolve every regional dispute.
Beijing is now applying a similar diplomatic approach to the Palestinian question. In July 2024, China convened fourteen Palestinian factions, including Fatah and Hamas, in Beijing.
The resulting Beijing Declaration on national unity echoed the goals of the 2007 Makkah Agreement, calling for a unity government, national elections and the restructuring of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
However, it also brought China’s diplomatic support for Palestinian statehood into sharper focus. Beijing reiterated its support for full Palestinian membership in the United Nations and expressed readiness to contribute to Gaza’s reconstruction.
The declaration represented another attempt to promote Palestinian reconciliation, although it did not establish an enforceable political guarantee. This points towards a possible new formula for conflict resolution in the Muslim world: Makkah provides religious legitimacy, while Beijing brings geopolitical influence and economic weight. Neither, on its own, has proved sufficient to resolve every conflict.
Where is this potential model needed today? At least three arenas demand urgent attention.
First, within Palestine itself. Without genuine Fatah-Hamas reconciliation, a viable Palestinian state remains difficult to achieve.
Second, on Pakistan’s western frontier. Since 2022, border clashes between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban administration have resulted in significant casualties. A purely military approach has failed to deliver lasting stability.
Third, in Sudan and Yemen, where civil wars involving Muslim communities have devastated entire societies.
These crises cannot be resolved in Makkah alone. Saudi Arabia retains considerable religious and diplomatic authority, but its direct involvement in the Yemen conflict has complicated its position as an impartial mediator.
China, conversely, possesses economic weight and diplomatic influence but lacks the religious legitimacy that Makkah holds across much of the Muslim world.
If Beijing alone convenes Palestinian factions, a legitimate question may arise among Arab publics: why should a non-Muslim power shape the political future of Muslim societies?
The solution may lie in a hybrid diplomatic architecture. Let the call for dialogue originate from Makkah to encourage acceptance across the Muslim world. Let economic incentives, diplomatic engagement and appropriate security arrangements involve Beijing to encourage compliance by the conflicting parties.
Such a model would combine religious legitimacy with practical geopolitical influence. However, its success would depend on the willingness of the parties themselves to negotiate and honour their commitments.
For Pakistan, this evolution carries profound implications. For decades, Pakistan’s mediation strategy has relied on relationships with external powers and capitals, including Makkah and Washington. Both approaches face new challenges. Washington is viewed by many as increasingly partisan in the Middle East, while Saudi-led initiatives do not always translate into lasting political settlements.
If Pakistan genuinely aspires to contribute to Muslim-world mediation, whether between Tehran and Riyadh or in stabilising its western border, it must engage with this emerging Makkah-to-Beijing framework.
Critics argue that China has limited experience in Islamic affairs. This is accurate, but incomplete. Beijing has expanded its diplomatic engagement with the region and appointed a Special Envoy for the Middle East, Zhai Jun, who has visited Arab capitals.
China has also engaged with the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and sought a greater role in regional diplomacy. It is investing in understanding the political language of the Muslim world, just as it once developed its influence in global trade.
The transition from Makkah to Beijing is not about replacing a sacred city with a superpower capital. It is about acknowledging a hard truth of twenty-first-century international politics: faith without finance and morality without power rarely achieve lasting peace.
The Makkah Agreement of 2007 gave the Muslim world hope. The Beijing Agreement of 2023 offered a different diplomatic method. The challenge now is to combine both approaches into a durable framework for the future.
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