Balochistan remains at the centre of one of Pakistan’s most difficult political, security and human rights challenges. The province has experienced separatist violence, armed attacks, political grievances and allegations of abuses for years. More recently, the conflict has become increasingly visible through attacks affecting security forces, infrastructure, civilians and foreign nationals.
The Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), a banned separatist organisation, has claimed responsibility for several major attacks. In March 2025, the group claimed responsibility for the hijacking of the Jaffar Express in Balochistan. The attack involved hundreds of passengers and ended with a Pakistani security operation in which the hostages were rescued and the attackers were killed. The incident demonstrated the scale and complexity of the security challenge facing the province.
The violence has continued. In August 2026, Pakistan’s military said security forces had killed 37 militants in operations in Balochistan as part of a wider series of operations in the country’s western provinces. That figure is a statement by the military and should be understood in that context.
Behind these events lies a fundamental question of international law: how far can a state go in using force against armed groups operating within its territory?
The starting point is sovereignty.
Sovereignty is not merely a political concept. It is a foundational principle of the international legal order. Article 2(1) of the United Nations Charter establishes the sovereign equality of states, while Article 2(4) requires states to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of other states. Article 2(7) also recognises limits on UN intervention in matters essentially within a state’s domestic jurisdiction.
For Pakistan, this means that Balochistan is part of the country’s territory and that the Pakistani state has sovereign authority over the province. The government has the responsibility to maintain public order, protect its population and respond to armed violence.
But sovereignty is not unlimited power.
The authority of a state does not place every action taken in the name of national security beyond international law. The legality of a particular operation depends on the circumstances, the applicable legal framework and the conduct of those carrying it out.
This distinction becomes especially important when violence reaches the level of a non-international armed conflict.
Not every episode of political violence, terrorism or civil unrest automatically constitutes an armed conflict under international humanitarian law. The classification depends on factors including the intensity of the fighting and the organisation of the non-state armed group involved. Where the threshold for a non-international armed conflict is met, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies, together with applicable customary international humanitarian law. Additional Protocol II may also apply where its specific conditions are satisfied.
This is where international law becomes particularly relevant to Pakistan’s counterinsurgency challenge.
International humanitarian law does not prevent a state from responding to an armed group. Instead, where IHL applies, it regulates how hostilities are conducted and establishes protections for people who are not, or are no longer, taking part in the fighting.
Three principles are particularly important: distinction, proportionality and precautions.
The principle of distinction requires parties to distinguish between civilians and persons taking part in hostilities, and between civilian objects and military objectives. Civilians cannot lawfully be treated as military targets simply because they live in an area where armed groups operate. Civilians remain protected from direct attack unless, and for such time as, they directly participate in hostilities.
The principle of proportionality imposes another important restriction. Even when an attack is directed at a legitimate military objective, it is prohibited if the expected incidental civilian harm would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
Then there is the requirement of precaution. Parties conducting attacks must take all feasible measures to verify targets and to avoid or minimise civilian casualties and damage to civilian objects. Where circumstances change, an attack may need to be cancelled or suspended if it would violate the applicable rules.
These obligations apply to all parties to an armed conflict. An armed group cannot claim that political grievances provide a legal justification for attacks against civilians, hostage-taking or indiscriminate violence. The pursuit of independence or political change does not make attacks on civilians lawful.
The same principle applies to the state.
Pakistan has the authority and responsibility to protect its population and respond to armed attacks. But allegations of unlawful killings, enforced disappearances or other abuses cannot simply be dismissed by invoking sovereignty or national security. Such allegations require appropriate investigation under the applicable domestic and international legal frameworks.
This does not mean treating the state and an armed group as politically or legally identical. A sovereign state and a non-state armed organisation occupy fundamentally different positions under international law. It does mean, however, that the conduct of each party can be subject to legal rules when the relevant legal framework applies.
That distinction is important because security and law are not competing objectives.
Effective counterinsurgency requires security. Sustainable peace requires legitimacy and public confidence in the institutions providing that security.
Balochistan therefore cannot be understood solely through the lens of military operations. The province’s problems also involve political representation, governance, development, grievances and public trust. International law cannot resolve all of those political questions, but it provides an important framework for determining the limits within which force may be used.
The Jaffar Express attack illustrates the other side of the equation. Deliberately attacking civilians, taking hostages and using violence against passengers cannot be justified by a political objective. The international humanitarian law framework protects civilians precisely because political disputes and armed conflicts do not remove basic humanitarian constraints. The 2025 attack demonstrated the devastating consequences when armed groups disregard those constraints.
The challenge for Pakistan is therefore not whether it can defend its territorial integrity. It can and must protect its people from armed violence.
The more difficult question is how that power is exercised.
A state strengthens its sovereignty when its institutions operate within the law, investigate credible allegations, distinguish civilians from combatants and provide lawful avenues for accountability. Conversely, when extraordinary security powers become detached from legal safeguards, the state’s claim to legitimacy can become weaker even when its underlying security concerns are genuine.
This is why sovereignty should not be understood as a blank cheque.
Sovereignty gives Pakistan authority over Balochistan. International law places limits on the manner in which that authority is exercised. Where IHL applies, those limits become particularly important during hostilities. Outside the conduct of hostilities, other bodies of law, including human rights law and domestic law, may govern state conduct.
The result is not a choice between sovereignty and human rights.
A functioning state needs both.
Pakistan’s long-term challenge in Balochistan is therefore to combine legitimate security measures with lawful conduct, political engagement and institutional accountability. Military force may be necessary to address armed attacks, but force alone cannot resolve the political conditions that allow an insurgency to retain support or regenerate.
International law does not require a state to surrender its sovereignty in the face of armed violence. It requires the state to exercise that sovereignty responsibly.
For Balochistan, that distinction matters.
The strength of a state is not measured only by its ability to defeat an armed opponent. It is also measured by its ability to protect civilians, uphold the law and preserve public trust while doing so.
Sovereignty gives the state authority. The rule of law gives that authority legitimacy.
Miss Diya Ashfaq
