China–Pakistan Cooperation in the Fight Against Terrorism: From Conventional Weapons to Artificial Intelligence

Modern warfare is undergoing a profound transformation.

The strength of a nation’s armed forces can no longer be measured solely by the number of tanks, artillery pieces, fighter aircraft or soldiers it possesses. Today, technological innovation, intelligence gathering, unmanned aerial vehicles, artificial intelligence, secure communications, electronic surveillance and the ability to detect emerging threats in real time are increasingly important to national security.

This transformation is particularly significant in the fight against terrorism. Unlike conventional warfare, counterterrorism operations rarely take place along clearly defined front lines. Threats can emerge from remote mountainous regions, insecure border areas, urban centres or clandestine networks operating across geographical boundaries. In such an environment, timely information, effective coordination and advanced technological capabilities can make a substantial difference.

Pakistan has endured decades of terrorism, sacrificing the lives of military personnel, law enforcement officers and civilians. Its security challenges make international cooperation, technological advancement and institutional capacity-building important components of its national security strategy.

Against this backdrop, China–Pakistan defence and security cooperation deserves closer examination. The relationship extends beyond the purchase of military equipment to include joint defence production, military training, counterterrorism exercises and cooperation in modern law enforcement.

The central question is not simply what weapons China supplies to Pakistan, but how bilateral cooperation can help Pakistan respond to evolving security threats while strengthening its own technological and industrial capabilities.

Beyond Weapons: A Broader Defence Partnership

China and Pakistan have maintained extensive defence relations for decades. According to Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, their cooperation encompasses military exchanges, personnel training, joint exercises, defence trade and joint defence production. These areas provide the institutional foundation for a broader security partnership.

One of the most prominent examples is the JF-17 Thunder, a multirole combat aircraft jointly developed by Pakistan and China. The programme illustrates how bilateral cooperation can extend beyond purchasing finished equipment to include engineering, manufacturing and the development of domestic industrial expertise.

Pakistan has also acquired Chinese J-10C fighter aircraft, while Chinese-origin air-defence and airborne surveillance platforms form part of Pakistan’s broader defence capabilities.

These systems are primarily associated with conventional defence and airpower rather than being dedicated counterterrorism tools. Nevertheless, they illustrate a wider principle: modern national security depends on the integration of equipment, information, trained personnel and effective command structures.

For Pakistan, the long-term value of cooperation with China will depend not only on access to advanced systems but also on the ability to maintain, operate and progressively improve them.

Drone Technology: A New Dimension of Counterterrorism

Unmanned aerial vehicles, commonly known as drones, have become an important feature of modern security operations. Depending on their design and lawful use, they can support surveillance, reconnaissance, terrain assessment and the monitoring of remote areas.

At the same time, commercially available and improvised drones can present serious security challenges when used for hostile purposes. This has increased the importance of counter-drone capabilities and specialised training.

Recent China–Pakistan military exercises demonstrate that both countries recognise these changing requirements.

The Warrior-IX joint counterterrorism exercise, conducted in Pakistan in late 2025, included drone reconnaissance and countermeasures, live-fire training, individual counterterrorism skills and coordinated operational drills. The exercise took place at the National Counter Terrorism Training Centre in Pabbi and provided an opportunity for personnel from both countries to train together.

More recently, Karakoram-2026 brought Chinese and Pakistani armies together for joint training focused on counterterrorism operations in high-altitude areas. According to China’s Ministry of National Defense, the programme included unmanned aerial vehicle operations, target-search and firing exercises, long-range sniping, joint command and field exercises. The nine-day training programme concluded in Korla, Xinjiang, on 22 October 2026.

These exercises are significant because they allow participating forces to exchange experience, practise coordinated procedures and improve interoperability in demanding environments.

However, a distinction must be maintained between using equipment during a joint exercise and transferring that equipment permanently to another country. Publicly reported exercises establish evidence of training and cooperation; they do not, by themselves, confirm the transfer of every technology demonstrated.

For Pakistan, the strategic priority should be to develop an integrated approach in which aerial surveillance, ground-based intelligence, communications and counter-drone measures complement one another. The objective should be better situational awareness, protection of vulnerable installations and improved responses to emerging threats.

Artificial Intelligence and the Modernisation of Law Enforcement

The fight against terrorism extends well beyond the battlefield. It also involves policing, border management, financial investigations, cybercrime prevention and the lawful collection and analysis of intelligence.

Artificial intelligence and digital technologies can assist law enforcement agencies in processing large volumes of information, identifying patterns, managing evidence and improving the coordination of investigations. When properly designed and supervised, such systems may help authorities use available resources more efficiently.

In September 2026, Pakistan and China agreed to expand cooperation in police training, modern technology and law enforcement. Reporting by Pakistan’s state broadcaster and Dawn indicated that China would assist Pakistan in establishing a modern law enforcement centre. The discussions also covered counterterrorism, counter-narcotics measures and the potential contribution of Chinese AI-based technologies and equipment.

This initiative represents a proposed area of cooperation, rather than evidence that a fully operational centre or a particular AI system has already been delivered.

Its potential importance lies in institutional capacity-building. Modern equipment can be useful, but its effectiveness depends on trained personnel, reliable data, secure infrastructure, clear operating procedures and coordination among relevant agencies.

Pakistan could benefit from further cooperation in digital forensics, cybercrime investigations, secure information management and specialised police training. Such cooperation should be accompanied by appropriate legal safeguards, independent oversight and protections for citizens’ privacy.

Artificial intelligence should support professional judgement, not replace it. Reliable evidence, human accountability and due process must remain central to law enforcement.

Air Defence, Surveillance and Situational Awareness

China’s defence cooperation with Pakistan also encompasses capabilities relevant to air defence and surveillance.

Pakistan operates Chinese-origin J-10C fighter aircraft, HQ-9/P air-defence systems and ZDK-03 airborne early-warning and control aircraft. These platforms serve broader military and air-defence functions and should not be confused with equipment specifically designed for counterterrorism operations.

Their wider relevance lies in the importance of situational awareness: the ability to identify potential threats, understand the surrounding operational environment and communicate information to the appropriate command authorities.

Counterterrorism requires a comparable principle at a different operational level. Security agencies need timely and reliable information from border monitoring, field intelligence, police reporting and other lawful sources.

The challenge is not simply acquiring advanced platforms. Pakistan must also ensure that its systems can communicate effectively, that personnel are adequately trained, and that maintenance, spare parts and technical support remain available.

A technologically advanced system delivers limited value if it cannot be sustained, integrated or operated effectively in the conditions for which it is intended.

Joint Defence Production: The Road to Greater Self-Reliance

For any country seeking long-term strategic autonomy, the ability to maintain and develop its own defence capabilities is as important as the ability to acquire modern equipment.

The JF-17 programme offers a prominent example of Pakistan–China cooperation in joint defence development and production. It demonstrates the potential benefits of a partnership that involves more than the purchase of finished products.

Pakistan can build on this experience by exploring further cooperation in defence electronics, communications equipment, surveillance technologies, counter-drone systems, testing facilities and maintenance capabilities.

Universities, research institutions, engineering firms and domestic manufacturers should have opportunities to participate in suitable joint research and industrial programmes.

The objective should be to develop local expertise, improve quality-control systems and reduce unnecessary dependence on imported components. Where agreements permit, technical training and meaningful technology transfer should be treated as long-term strategic priorities.

Such progress, however, requires clear contractual arrangements. Every proposed partnership should establish what technology will actually be transferred, what local manufacturing is feasible, what intellectual property rights apply and how much maintenance can eventually be undertaken within Pakistan.

Self-reliance does not mean abandoning international partnerships. It means ensuring that international cooperation progressively strengthens domestic capabilities.

Protecting CPEC and Shared Security Interests

Security cooperation between China and Pakistan is also shaped by the protection of Chinese citizens, infrastructure and projects associated with the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

Chinese personnel, engineers and businesses operating in Pakistan require a secure environment. For Pakistan, protecting these people and projects is both a security responsibility and an important condition for maintaining investor confidence and economic cooperation.

The two countries have repeatedly emphasised counterterrorism cooperation and the security of Chinese personnel and projects. Recent discussions on law enforcement and counterterrorism reflect the continuing importance of these shared concerns.

Yet the relationship should be understood in practical terms rather than through slogans alone. Pakistan and China have overlapping interests, but each also has its own national priorities and responsibilities.

China can contribute technology, equipment, training and institutional experience. Pakistan must ensure that its own security institutions are capable, coordinated, accountable and responsive to local conditions.

No imported technology can compensate for weaknesses in intelligence coordination, inadequate training or ineffective implementation. Similarly, security arrangements must be designed to protect both personnel and surrounding communities while respecting Pakistan’s laws and national sovereignty.

Long-term security requires not only protecting individual projects but also addressing the wider conditions that allow violent networks to operate.

What Pakistan Should Prioritise Next

To obtain lasting benefits from its cooperation with China, Pakistan should focus on five strategic priorities.

First, strengthen drone and counter-drone capabilities. Investment should extend beyond equipment procurement to training, maintenance, local research and the integration of lawful surveillance systems with existing security arrangements.

Second, modernise law enforcement and intelligence coordination. Police, counterterrorism agencies and relevant institutions need secure information-sharing mechanisms, professional training and reliable investigative tools. Information must be assessed carefully and acted upon in accordance with the law.

Third, deepen local defence production. Joint programmes should create meaningful opportunities for Pakistani engineers, manufacturers and research institutions. The long-term objective should be to expand domestic technical expertise and sustainment capacity.

Fourth, invest in cybersecurity and technical skills. Advanced systems require trained operators, secure networks, reliable maintenance and protection against cyber threats. These capabilities should be developed alongside the procurement of equipment.

Fifth, adopt a comprehensive approach to counterterrorism. Military operations and advanced technology are important, but they cannot independently deliver lasting peace. Effective policing, credible investigations, functioning courts, public trust, education and economic opportunity are also essential.

These priorities would allow Pakistan to approach technological cooperation not merely as a means of obtaining equipment, but as an opportunity to strengthen institutions and develop long-term national capabilities.

Conclusion: Measuring Partnership by Results

The importance of China–Pakistan relations should not be measured solely by defence agreements, official statements or displays of advanced military equipment. Their real value will be demonstrated through practical outcomes: better threat detection, more effective law enforcement, improved protection of sensitive infrastructure and the preservation of human life.

Drones, artificial intelligence, surveillance platforms, secure communications and joint defence production are increasingly important elements of modern security. China–Pakistan cooperation offers opportunities in these fields, while joint military exercises provide a practical setting for training and operational coordination.

Nevertheless, Pakistan’s objective should extend beyond acquiring sophisticated weapons. It should seek to build a security and defence system that understands modern technology, adapts it to national requirements, sustains it through domestic expertise and uses it responsibly.

The defining challenge of twenty-first-century security is not simply to possess advanced equipment. It is to integrate technology, intelligence, training, industrial capability and effective institutions into a coherent national strategy.

For China and Pakistan, the next stage of their partnership should therefore focus on converting cooperation into capability, capability into institutional strength, and institutional strength into sustainable peace.

Ultimately, the measure of this partnership will not be the sophistication of the technology acquired, but the security, resilience and lasting benefits it delivers to the people of Pakistan.